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It is a pleasure and a privilege to contribute an article to the issue of this journal in
honor of Professor Mark Perlman, whose work has an almost encyclopedic scope
and embraces major contributions to institutional economics, labor economics,
constitutional economics, and to various strands of evolutionary economics and
the history of economic thought (Perlman, 1996; Perlman and McCann, 1998; see
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also the publication in honor of Mark Perlman edited by Lim, Park and Harcourt,
2002). However, there is a perennial theme in Perlman’s work, be it in institutional
economics or the history of economic thought, a theme that establishes a unity in
all that variety: it is the human individual. As any reader of his work will certainly
acknowledge, this theme involves far more than the usual cliche´ that the human
factor is important. This contribution is in the spirit of Perlman’s work.
1 Instrumental realism
The following is an attempt to contribute some ideas on the problem of the micro
foundations of economics from an evolutionary perspective. There is no general
agreement within the discipline of economics about whether improved micro foun-
dations will actually lead to better theory.
We share the view that more empirical groundwork, including interdisciplinary
research, may indeed contribute to an improved reconstruction of theory. The fol-
lowing discussion explicitly recognizes the signiﬁcance of the postulates ofmethod-
ological realism. This position, however, does not endorse the view that there is
virtue per se in gathering empirical data or engaging in interdisciplinary research.
Any observational or experimental data are bound to meet the speciﬁc demands
of a particular process of theory formation. The facts never speak without the
instrumental guidance provided by some deductive notion. The advantage of an
instrumentalist stand is that it presupposes a statement about the theoretical posi-
tions to which the micro foundations apply. Our approach to realism may be called
instrumentalist in the sense that it calls for a clear deductive statement about the
objectives of empirical research. Our methodological stand may therefore be called
instrumental realism.
It is important to understand that there is an essential difference between the
theoretical questions and the ontological underpinnings of neoclassical economics
and evolutionary economics. The theoretical focus of neoclassical economics is
static: it dealswith the allocationof scarce resources in an equilibrium framework. In
a neoclassical model, endogenous variables are always rapidly changing variables.
The model relegates the comprehensive set of slowly changing variables to the
exogenous realm.By contrast, evolutionary economics deals essentiallywith slowly
changing variables. What is exogenous in the neoclassical model in fact comprises
the endogenous core of evolutionary economics. In this sense, the broad scope of
evolutionary economics constitutes a return to classical economics. The latter, too,
made such variables as technology, institutions or preferences central to the model.
In evolutionary economics, as in classical analysis, stasis is only a “time slice”
through an inherently open and dynamic process.
Furthermore, neoclassical economics relies on a nomological approach. As in
classical physics, a law is propounded which allows an event to be determined
precisely, given sufﬁcient information about initial and subsidiary conditions. The
locus of the law in neoclassical economics is homo oeconomicus. The initial con-
ditions are deﬁned as resource constellations that offer the agents a set of proﬁtable
transactions. The set of subsidiary conditions given by the exogenous variables is
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kept constant. The terminal state is deﬁned by an equilibrium where all proﬁtable
transactions have taken place and a Pareto optimum has been attained.
Let us consider the difference between neoclassical and evolutionary economics
from an ontological perspective. The bare bones of this perspective are that all en-
tities, agents, traded resources can be conceived of as carriers of rules. This view
is derived from an ontology that we have developed more systematically elsewhere
(Dopfer and Potts, forthcoming). A rule will be deﬁned as a deductive schema that
allows operations. The economic system is, in this view, seen as being composed
of two levels: the generic (rule) level and the operant (production, transaction, con-
sumption) level. In terms of a causal schema, the variables at the generic level are
the causal ones, while operations are the effects or the consequences of these in the
two-level schema. From the ontological perspective, the difference between neo-
classical and evolutionary economics lies in their distinctive treatments of generic
variables (for detailed discussion Dopfer, 2004). More speciﬁcally, the difference
between neoclassical and evolutionary economics manifests itself in two ways.
On the one hand, neoclassical economics deals only with a single generic vari-
able represented by the behavioral rule disposition of homo oeconomicus, while
evolutionary economics includes a broad range of generic variables. On the other
hand, neoclassical economics keeps this rule variable constant, while evolutionary
economics expressly allows for a change in rules.
The tenet of instrumental realism is that micro foundations must be helpful
for theory construction and should not be remote from economic reality. Thus
evolutionary economics calls for an economic agent who deals with rules in various
complex ways.In an evolutionary perspective, homo oeconomicus is a rule-making
and rule-using animal. The quest to recognize this nature of an economic agent does
not stem here from the postulate of adequate realism. It results instead from the need
to have instrumentally adequate micro foundations for evolutionary economics.
2 Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus (HSO)
The art of acquiring adequate micro foundations involves reconciling the demands
of instrumental adequacy with those of empirical validity. In coping with the latter,
the question arises of which empirically valid image of the human factor could
serve as a yardstick for sufﬁcient realism. We argue that homo sapiens should
be the empirical reference point for any discussion about the realism of the micro
foundations of economics. Evolutionary biology, anthropology and related sciences
provide ample empirical material which allows us to formulate hypotheses or rea-
sonable conjectures about homo sapiens. Homo sapiens appears, above all, to be
an animal who uses and makes tools. Furthermore, homo sapiens exceeds all other
primates in self-perception and the use of symbolic-verbal language. Human lan-
guage, which has enabled efﬁcient and efﬁcacious social communication and has
profoundly increased human cognition, has possibly co-evolved with the aptitude
for tool making and tool using.
What is the general feature of homo sapiens? Tool production, tool usage, lan-
guage creation, language use and related activities of homo sapiens have a common
denominator in that they all rely on rules. Homo sapiens can thus be viewed more
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generally as a rule-making and rule-using animal. As a concept, homo sapiens ob-
tains its instrumental adequacy when it operates in an economic context. Therefore,
a construct that may serve as an appropriate micro foundation for an evolutionary
economic theory is Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus (HSO).
The traditional homo oeconomicus fails in crucial ways with respect to the
demand for realism. All available interdisciplinary evidence points to a picture
of the human species in which this species deals in various and essential ways
with rules. Any theory that involves human action but excludes the whole complex
of rules, is likely to mis-state the nature of reality, not only marginally, but in a
fundamental way. The central empirical deﬁcit of homo oeconomicus is, therefore,
not the unrealistic behavioral assumptions (conﬁning decision making to a rational
procedure), but the failure to take account of the basic nature of humans as rule-
making and rule-using creatures.
3 Taxonomy of rules
‘Rule’ and ‘rule carrier’ are analytical terms that can be employed in various the-
oretical contexts. In biology, rules are genes, and rule carriers are organisms or
species. The beauty of the neo-Darwinian model is that the entire process of bi-
ological evolution can be expressed on the basis of a single rule-type – the gene.
The question of particular interest at this juncture is whether there is analogously
in economics a single rule in the form of an ‘economic gene’ that would allow us
to expound the salient characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics and structure of
an economic system. While reduction is the hallmark of any scientiﬁc inquiry, we
argue that economic evolution is more complex than biological evolution and that
any reduction to a single rule-type would mis-state essential aspects of the subject
matter under investigation.
We propose a rule taxonomy that embraces three rule types with distinct rule
carrier instances: cognitive, behavioral and blueprint rules. Though closely interre-
lated, these rule types cannot be substituted for each other; the process of cognition,
for instance, must be explained by cognitive rules and cannot be explained by any
other rule type. The rule taxonomy presented in Figure 1 introduces the notions of
agent rules and organizational rules, recognizing the signiﬁcance of the distinction
between the agent and the environment of which it is a part. The general distinction
is useful since most evolutionary models are built on the premise of a systemic
agent-environment relationship.
Cognitive rules refer to cognition, or thought processes, which are independent
of the external world and of observation. The reality evoked by cognitive rules is
timeless and spaceless and enables us to solve economic problems by reconstructing
the past and by imagining possible futures. There is a growing body of studies in
cognitive economics which allows expressly for the integration of the evolutionary
dynamic of cognitive rules (Rizello, 2003). In this vein, Dosi et al. (2004) have
argued that “cognitive rules or categories (....) go together with variousmechanisms
of framing throughwhich information is interpreted and also rendered operationally
meaningful to the decision-makers.(....) Frames appear to be (....) an ubiquitous
feature of both decision-making and learning. What one understands is ﬁltered
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of rules
by the cognitive categories that one holds and the repertoires of elicited problem-
solving skills depend on the ways the problem itself is framed.”
Individual behavior, like cognition, is governed by the human cortex. The sub-
sequent discussion that revolves around Figure 2 will highlight the connections
between behavior and various cortical areas. In contradistinction to cognition,
however, individual behavior also always relates in some way to an instance of
the external world. Individual behavior is a joint result of internal cognitive pow-
ers and external environmental contingencies. Externally, individual behavior is
governed by a double contingency. First, it relates to the behavior of other agents,
and second, it relates to objects, such as artefacts and physical resources. External
behavioral referents are always associated with the task of organization. The co-
ordination of the behavior of many agents requires rules for social organization,
while the allocation of physical resources requires rules for technical organization.
Organizational rules apply to all levels of an economic system.At a micro level,
transaction rules enable exchange operations in the market, and/or the organiza-
tional rules of a ﬁrm its productive operations. At a macro level, organizational
rules refer to the coordination of market behaviors and the allocation of the traded
resources. At all levels, the organization represents a composite of individual rules
to which the agents must submit. The question is not whether agents in an organi-
zation must submit to rules but rather who, or what, authority sets those rules. The
micro and the macro levels deal with different degrees of organizational complex-
ity. In a market economy (unlike in a centrally planned one), the organization of the
micro units, such as the ﬁrm, is trusted to the autonomy of individual agents, such
as the entrepreneur, while, at the macroscopic level, coordination and allocation are
left to the self-organizing powers of the market. The discussion in this paper is on
the micro foundations and invites a focus on intentional behavior and consciously
planned forms of organization.
In this perspective, the ﬁrm is a complex nexus of organizational rules which
vary in their ability to coordinate the behavior of its agents and to allocate its
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resources. (The division between ability-based and resources-based approaches is
ill conceived). The organization of physical objects, such as machines or technical
equipment, can be based on ﬁxed templates, and in our taxonomy we refer to this
type of rule as a blueprint rule. In their regulatory function, the rules pertaining to
social organization resemble blueprint rules, but in relation to human behavior they
do not share the determinism of the blueprint rules as this stems from the logic of
technology. The explanatory core of an evolutionary theory of the ﬁrm or any other
micro unit must be a behavioral model that links with both the subjective cognitive
dimension of rules and the objective blueprint dimension (Sect. 4).
It is possible to explain the structure and dynamics of an economic system in a
mono-causal way by focusing on one rule dimension only. In a Marxian perspec-
tive, for instance, the objective laws of the aggregate technical rules determine the
aggregate social rules the objective interplay of which governs the structure and
long-run dynamics of an economic system. While cognitive rules lose their mean-
ing in the deterministic machinery of the Marxian model, they play a pivotal role
in Austrian economics and related subjectivist strands of the discipline. From an
evolutionary point of view, the structure and dynamics of an economic system can
be explained only on the basis of a model that embraces all three dimensions – the
cognitive, behavioral and blueprint rule dimensions.
4 Rule trajectory
Besides rule and rule carrier, a third term that highlights the process dynamic of a
rule will be introduced. In biology, a new rule is created by an error in the genetic
replication of a whole organism, and evolution occurs when that error is selectively
retained in a species over generations. In economics, micro units, such as ﬁrms,
that are carriers of “economic genes”, are rarely replicated as wholes. Instead,
partial rules are generated and adopted macroscopically by a population of carriers
of this kind. The Darwinian schema of mutation-selection-retention operates with
implications that do not apply to economic evolution, and a more general schema
of the rule dynamic is therefore required in order to arrive at a valid theoretical
exposition of economic evolution. A rule trajectory that expounds the essential
general features of rule evolution can be stated in terms of three process phases:
1. Origination of rule
2. Adoption of rule
3. Retention of rule
The ﬁrst phase feeds on cognitive rules, and the trajectory process is set in motion
when a novel rule (invention) is connected to the behavioral domain (innovation).
The core of the second phase represents a path-dependent dynamic in which an
existing adoption frequency inﬂuences subsequent adoption probabilities. An or-
ganizational rule may be introduced intentionally into a ﬁrm’s domain, but its
implementation will depend on the power of the emergent behavioral parameter. In
the third phase, a critical adoption frequency is reached and the collectively adopted
rule is used recurrently for economic operations. The self-stabilizing retention pro-
The economic agent as rule maker and rule user 183
cess of the third phase can be labeled an institution. The routines that Nelson and
Winter (1982) wrote about are rules that have attained institutional status.
5 Biological predisposition
So far, we have sketched a model which views the cognition and behavior of HSO
as governed by its previously acquired rule disposition. This was based on the
assumption that HSO is equipped with a biological predisposition which enables
the formation of a distinct disposition for how to behave and think in the economic
context. The notion of biological predisposition is broader than that of generic
(culturally contingent) disposition. Homo sapiens has a phylogenetic history, and
the biological predisposition had been in existence long before the generic one
was acquired. A salient characteristic of biological evolution is that antecedent
life-forms are not lost, but rather are integrated into the higher, more complex,
life-forms.
The human brain is thus composed of both phylogenetically old and phyloge-
netically new neuronal mechanisms. We denote the former as the archecortex, and
the later as the neocortex. The distinction is employed in both evolutionary biology
and the neurosciences (Zeier, 1980). We take over the general empirical content of
the concepts from these disciplines, but use them in a way that enables them to still
serve the purpose of economic theory formation. We deﬁne the archecortex as a
complex of interconnected neuronal mechanisms that perform a range of tasks that
can be accomplished on the basis of automatisms.As these cortical mechanisms are
not acquired by learning, they are independent of the rule disposition. The neocor-
tex accommodates more complex mechanisms, which include the faculty to form
a rule disposition that enables complex problem solving.
Figure 2 provides a conceptual model which delineates the brain in its neuronal
interconnectivities between archecortex and neocortex (vertical circular loop) on
the one hand, and the speciﬁc sets of tasks which the cortical domains can perform
(horizontal circular loops) on the other. The archecortical mechanisms perform var-
ious internal basal functions that relate to the respiration system, blood circulation
and metabolism. The neocortical mechanisms enable complex operations that re-
late internally to cognition and externally to behavior aimed at complex problem
Basal functions
Neocortex
cognition
Environment
behaviour
Archecortex
Autonomic
mechanisms
Fig. 2. Model of brain with internal and external loops
184 K. Dopfer
solving in evolving environments. The upper horizontal loop essentially denotes
the formation of the rule disposition of HSO.
Cortical interconnectivity means that the archecortex inﬂuences, via its au-
tomatisms, higher cognition and behaviors. In turn, the neocortex exerts a limited
conscious control over the auto-mechanisms.The link from the phylogenetically old
areas to the neocortical domains is of particular interest, since economics naturally
deals with complex problem-solving involving advanced areas of the cortex. Emo-
tions, moods and feelings are archecortical manifestations that may signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence neocortical functions (Damasio, 2000), such as cognition and behavior in
economic contexts. These “non-rational manifestations”, as they are conceived in
mainstream economics, may be subject to conscious control, but the essential point
to grasp here is that emotions, moods and feelings are always present in the cortical
disposition governing economic actions. They represent potentially powerful, and
mostly unpredictable, forces in the economic process. We shall return to the issue
of neuronal interconnectivities in a moment when discussing characteristics of the
neocortex.
6 Neocortex: on cognition
The hemispheric specialization of the neocortex is an evolutionary improvement
found uniquely in the human brain. The left and the right sides of the neocortex
perform distinct functions (Sperry, 1974). The left hemisphere is specialized in
analytical, sequential and propositional abilities required for verbal expression and
arithmetical operations. It allows syntactical reasoning and computational proce-
dures such as adding, multiplying or equation solving, to be carried out. The right
hemisphere, by contrast, is specialized in geometric, synthetic, pictorial and spatial
abilities. It enables the brain to combine elements into a whole, say to assemble col-
ored blocks to make a mosaic picture (Taeuber, 1974, in Eccles and Popper, 1977),
allowing a comparison of singular observations, images or conceptions to be made
on the basis of a Gestalt. While the left hemisphere is positional, the right breaks
up the whole into its parts. It is able to conceive isolated entities as complementary
components of a whole and to comprehend the holistic nature of this whole. The
division of knowledge and labor in an economy relies fundamentally on the ability
of this type of relational and appositional thinking.
7 Cortical fuzziness: on indeterminacy
The brain is sketched as being composed of an archecortical and a neocortical area,
with a division into specialized hemispheres of the latter. Temporarily, there can
be a certain dominance in the neuronal activities pertaining to a speciﬁc compart-
ment depending on the type of cognition or behavior involved at a particular time.
However, as a most important feature of neuronal organization, the high thalamo-
cortical interconnectivity, which represents a hub from which any site of the cortex
can communicate with one or more other such sites, carries out the task of overall
co-ordination and control (Llinas, 2003). In particular, the interconnected cortical
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levels allow the neocortical control of areas responsible for body-sensory functions
and emotions to operate. Individuals have a cognitive ability to identify, understand
and instrumentalize emotions adaptively and to use them as some form of intelli-
gence (Foster, 2000). In connecting emotional intelligence to the requirements of
an economic system, we are not dealing here with a “logical form of intelligence
that corresponds to the IQ, but instead with an “evolutionary intelligence”, which
“reﬂects the ability to learn and change” (Allen, 2004). Higher order mental ac-
tivities are embedded in neuronal structures of the archecortex and produce a soft
emotionally colored cognition. The archecortical – particularly thalamic, cerebel-
lar and hippocampic – areas interconnected with the neocortical site equip humans
with a cortical organization that provides them with intelligent emotions (viewed
from the archecortex) andwith emotional intelligence (viewed from the neocortex).
Similar interconnectivities exist with respect to the lateralization of the brain.
The left hemisphere adds to the performance of the right by providing some es-
sential verbal symbolism and syntactical assistance. The right hemisphere, in turn,
supports the left with its pre-eminent properties of spatial, relational and integrating
abilities. There is no unilateral dominance of one hemisphere over the other, say
the left over the right, but rather a complementary specialization. The hemispheric
interconnectivities generate a basic fuzziness in human cognition, and we may as-
sume that it is precisely this indeterminacy of the cognitive process that constitutes
a major source of human creativity. The interplay of distinct, but complementarily
specialized abilities triggers the imagination that is at the very root of the creation of
novelty, and that, in turn, propels economic growth and development.Any economic
theory designed to cope with economic change is bound to recognize the creative
and imaginative sources of novelty, discovery and innovative problem solving.
8 Consciousness
The interconnected sites of the human cortex accommodate speciﬁc abilities. In
addition, the unity of the cortex gives it a non-speciﬁc ability to conceive. (Edel-
man and Tononi, 2000). Where we should localize the cortical self-reﬂection or
self-recognition that may be embraced by the notion of consciousness still seems
to be an open issue in the literature of the neurosciences and philosophy. We pro-
pose that the domain of all cortical interconnectivities represents not only the locus
of instrumentally speciﬁc cognitive abilities but also of non-speciﬁc human con-
sciousness.
More speciﬁcally, consciousness allows for intentionality. Intentionality gains
practical signiﬁcance when it receives support from will power. This component of
instrumental consciousness provides the base for individual economic operations,
such as decision making and individual choice.
The factors of intentionality and will power are closely associated with the ego
or the self of a person. Eccles and Popper have proposed a dualistic interaction
theory where the conscious self interacts with the dominant left hemisphere of
the brain. Their theory is useful for reconstructing the micro foundations of eco-
nomics since it emphasizes the active role of the individual. However, it has been
challenged on grounds that it is trapped in Cartesian Dualism (Bunge, 1980). The
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theory may also be challenged on neurophysiological grounds given that the right
(and not the left) hemisphere with its holistic abilities could cope better with the
problem of unity, presumably by conscious control or self-awareness. Given the
double interconnectivities, the neuronal pattern of the conscious state may change,
depending on the dominance of the neuronal activities of the cortical sites. Hence,
both the intensity and the locus of cortical dominance may vary considerably, and
this will give the human self its distinct character at a particular time. HSO has a
bounded self as well as bounded rationality.
9 Departures from homo oeconomicus
The preceding discussion has been guided by the methodological imperative of
realistic assumptions. The following propositions about HSO provide some sub-
stantive rationale for a critique of the fundamental shortcomings of neoclassical
homo oeconomicus and may serve as an interdisciplinary platform for the subse-
quent discussion. The propositions are:
1. Non-decomposability of cortical levels and hemispheres, which govern human
cognition and behavior,
2. Non-homogeneity of specialized cortical areas compoundedby complex cortical
double interconnectivities,
3. Non-periodicity of both dominant and fuzzy interconnected neural processes.
The proposition of non-decomposability strikes a fatal empirical blow to the
unilateral model of homo oeconomicus. Computational and analytical abilities are
emotionally colored, and they are linked simultaneously with the ongoing pattern
generation of the lateral counterpart. Perfect rationality based on splitting the cor-
tical hemispheres and the exclusive activation of the left is – given the ﬁndings
of modern neuroscience – an abstruse concept. The neoclassical decomposability
assumption not only yields an ill-conceived concept of rationality, but it also shuts
all doors to an investigation of the sources of creativity and ingenuity in complex
economic problem solving because it ignores the cross-cortical fuzziness.
Second, the proposition of non-homogeneity provides a point of departure for
an analysis of the complex variety that governs economic cognition and economic
behavior. Non-homogeneity, or variety, is an essential characteristic of all evolu-
tionary approaches. There is a fundamental, ontologically-rooted, difference be-
tween typological thinking dealing with averages, on the one hand, and population
thinking allowing for variety, on the other (Metcalfe, 2004). The neoclassical rep-
resentative agent who appears as a machine a` l’homme is entirely at odds with
neurophysiological evidence.
Third, the proposition of non-periodicity of cortical activities has both theoret-
ical and methodological implications for economics. Theoretically, the differences
that occur with repeated economic actions are not anomalies but constitute the nor-
mal case. This is to say, variation in behavior is not an anomaly to be explained, but
is instead the very essence of evolutionary rational behavior. Furthermore, given
the circular causation between agent and environment (upper loop in Fig. 2), the
intercortical fuzziness suggests the hypothesis that any external pressure exerted on
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an agent may generate novelty and a change in problem solving procedures. Envi-
ronmental constraints feed back to the agent, and by spurring new problem solving,
affects the extant constraints reversely. Standard veriﬁcation relies on repeatability
criteria, but this cannot be done in an evolutionary context. Instead, such a con-
text must allow for non-repeatability, and thus accept heterogeneity and change as
standards of normality.
10 Operant and generic agenda
In contemporary economics, we are witnessing a growing interest in empirical
research related to the reconstruction of the micro foundations.A large body of data
has been provided by research conducted in experimental behavioral economics and
in neuroeconomics. These studies are generally interesting with regard to both the
experimental and statistical methodologies employed and the way in which the
experiments are interwoven with a theoretical schema. The theoretical questions
addressed by drawing on recent behavioral and brain research aremainly inspired by
neoclassical economics. Their kind of empirical research is designed to challenge
the empirical status of homo oeconomicus assuming that neoclassical economists
are generally concerned with the realism of assumptions.
A research program emerges that is very much committed to the “hunt for
anomalies” of homo oeconomicus. All ﬁndings obtained so far demonstrate that
humans are not merely rational decision makers who pursue selﬁsh aims, but are as
well creatures who systematically contradict the rationality assumption by widely
exhibiting reciprocally altruistic behavior (e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). In par-
ticular, the ﬁndings of experimental neuroeconomics demonstrate that economic
transactions not only lead to the activation of brain areas responsible for cognitive
processes, such as the prefrontal dorsolateral areas, but they also simultaneously ac-
tivate areas such as the anterior insula which are the locus of emotions and typically
archecortical functions (Sanfay et al., 2003; Camerer, 2003). Ongoing experimen-
tal studies approach the micro foundation problem from two different directions –
behavioral economics focuses on external behavior and neuroeconomics concen-
trates on the internal behavior of economic agents. The ﬁndings of both research
areas yield a picture of an operant human agent who is both boundedly rational and
emotional, selﬁsh and reciprocally altruistic, fair and unfair, all at the same time.
The research conducted in the two ﬁelds does not address the question of the
basic nature of the cognitive and behavioral dispositions. The program focuses
on theoretical questions concerning regularities in economic operations and thus
presumes a basically constant disposition. However, empirical research aimed at
analyzing the generic level must start with the assumption that cognitive and be-
havioral dispositions change over time. The core of an evolutionary micro program
consists of an analysis of generic change. The research questions are based on the
premise that the cognitive and behavioral dispositions of economic agents are not,
in general, original, they also involve to a signiﬁcant extent a body of acquired,
culturally contingent rules.
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11 Towards micro foundations for evolutionary economics
The instrumental adequacy of empirically warranted micro assumptions depends
on the theoretical framework for which they are designed. It is beyond the scope of
this article to outline a full blown theoretical agenda for evolutionary economics,
but a few building blocks dealing with requirements for micro foundations may be
furnished. The analytical core unit is deﬁned as a rule which is actualized by the
population of its carriers. We call this analytical unit a meso regime.
The macro domain of the economic system is viewed as a structure composed
of meso regimes. The macroscopic structure refers to both the structure of rules
and the structure of rule adoption frequencies. Thus, there is a deep structure that
is composed of ideas or semantic information deﬁning the rules, and a surface
structure that refers to the relative frequencies of the physical rule-actualizations.
Whereas the deep structure is invisible and can only be described qualitatively, the
surface structure is visible, and thus measurable in numbers.
The analytical unit of a meso regime is neither micro nor macro. It includes
individual agents as micro components, and is a complementary component of a
macro structure. We argue that the meso unit is at the very heart of an evolutionary
analysis designed to explain economic coordination and economic change. Consid-
ering the signiﬁcance and possible explanatory power of the concept, it is surprising
how little attention the branch of a so-deﬁned meso-economics has received up to
now. (Dopfer et al., forthcoming).
The question is this – how can the meso concept be used for developing a
better micro-foundation, in particular in relation to cognition and behavior? The
concept of a rule brings the issue of complementarity into focus. A rule must
ﬁt the structure of complementarities in a system. The individual cognition and
behavior underlying the logic of rule complementarity is adaptation. Darwin’s
essential lesson shows that rules will not be selected if they are not adapted to the
other rules (which compose the environment). The economic criterion to be met
here is not efﬁciency, but efﬁcacy. An agent can only be economically successful
if equipped with a disposition that allows efﬁcacious cognition and efﬁcacious
behavior. This applies to both factor markets, which call for an understanding of
technical complementarities or the integration of routines into capital (Cantner
and Pyka, 1998), and consumer markets, where preference complementarities and
lifestyle adaptations are important (Earl and Potts, forthcoming).
Up to now, there has been little experimental evidence suggesting that special
cortical areas are activated when economic agents perform tasks related to the
solution of pattern problems. Experiments demonstrating that neuronal activities
in special cortical areas do indeed occur during the process of adaptation to the
complementarity requirements cited above would be an important step towards an
empirically valid economic theory.
The preceding discussion has brought the aspect of economic structure into
focus. However, each structural component of the economic system is, by its very
nature, also dynamic. A structural component represents a process involving cog-
nition and behavior. We have conceived the structural process unit as a rule that
connects with other rules in a structure and unfolds as a process along a trajectory
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with three phases. Phase 1 is associated with the generation of novel rules. Phase 2
involves selective adoption and learning, phase 3 is characterized by stabilization
and retention at both the microscopic and the macroscopic scales. What needs to
be analyzed at this point is how cognition and behavior that are needed to perform
phase-speciﬁc tasks may be explained on the basis of available empirical evidence.
However, there is another important issue which we need to address ﬁrst.
12 Herbert Simon’s concept of docility
Humans have speciﬁc capabilities concerning the processing of rules. Likewise,
their cognition and behavior can be rule-efﬁcient or rule-efﬁcacious to various
extents. However, there is also a general biological predisposition which motivates
humans to get involved in rule activities. Besides motivation, there must be a basic
trust in the rule behavior of other agents and in the validity of rules generated by
them.
Simon has argued that humans have a biological disposition for “docility”
(2004). He suggests that humans generally do not consider costs or material re-
wards when producing rules for the public domain. At the generic level, economic
agents display behavior characterized by non-reciprocal altruism. Simon criticizes
the narrowing down of the concept of altruism to its reciprocal form. He speciﬁcally
rejects any attempt to employ his own concept of bounded rationality in the context
of reciprocal altruism as suggested by neo-institutional economics.
Rule altruism is effective whenever it encounters trust on the part of a poten-
tial rule adopter. This generic trust extends beyond the operant trust employed in
market transactions. Much of the knowledge upon which economic agents operate
is provided by other agents and a general absence of generic trust would lead to a
breakdown of the entire system. (Noteboom, 2003; Khalil, 2003).
As a brief, but perhaps important, methodological note, I would like to remark
that the received doctrine of experimental economics always suggests a search for
behavioral regularities. For instance, empirical regularities in economic cooperation
are derived from an experimental setting involving group selection. The hallmark
of the procedure is that its empirical results are static because they are designed to
demonstrate how reality is at some speciﬁc point of time. By contrast, evolutionary
economists adopt a more process-oriented view. Rules are considered to be emer-
gent properties of a rule adoption process occurring in a group. The dynamics may
be modeled on the basis of the rule trajectory proposed earlier. Simulation models
seem to be an appropriate tool for this task, as they allow different assumptions
about the rule disposition of agents, and modeling the rule adoption process in its
emergent, often unpredictable properties.
Assumptions of this kind are not a trivial matter, and there must be good argu-
ments to warrant any work aimed at improving the empirical content of economic
theory.We argue that homo sapiens oeconomicus is a rule-maker, and this includes
the proposition that the dispositions of the agents, which determine their cognition
and behavior in economic contexts, evolve over time and feature emergent proper-
ties. Let us see how the unique evolutionary accomplishment – the sapiens –merges
into homo oeconomicus.
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13 Beyond monkeys
What can homo sapiens do that other primates cannot? (Note ‘primates’ refer to
members of the highest order of mammalia including humans, monkeys, lemurs
etc.) Humans can, as we know, use tools. This is a remarkable evolutionary achieve-
ment, but not unique to humans.Various experiments have shown that other primates
demonstrate surprising aptness when exposed to problems whose solution call for
cognitive skills, for instance, using sticks to collect ants. Furthermore, homo sapiens
is capable of learning but so too are other primates. For instance, observations of
macaque populations on the Japanese island of Koshima show that skill in washing
potatoes in the ocean has spread over the entire population (Kawai, 1965; in Zeier
1980). The skill has been observed, understood as a rule, and then applied as such.
Humans are typically social animals; but so are most other primates and many
other species as well. A large part of the social behavior of primates is due to non-
acquired original behavior, but recent observations have shown that the biological
predisposition also allows a generic rule disposition of social behavior to be formed.
For instance, rhesusmonkeys are notorious for their aggressive nature while stump-
tail monkeys typically show cooperative and conciliatory behavior within their
group. Co-housing the juveniles of the two species leads to a dramatic change
in their behaviors: the rhesus monkeys co-housed with the stump-tail macaques
adopt the cooperative and conciliatory behavioral rules of the latter (de Waal and
Johanowicz, 1993; in Cummins, 2001).
Hope that the human species scores better with regard to its uniqueness does
seem to be warranted when we turn to culture. Humans have the ability to preserve
rule-knowledge over generations, and in doing so they have history. However, the
fact that evolutionary anthropologists have recently discovered a workshop for nut
cracking in the Tai forests of the Ivory Coast that is 150 years old (Boesch, 1999)
is disappointing if we want to think of our species as unique. The “tool capital” of
the workshop and the tool knowledge have been handed down from generation to
generation. We usually associate such activities with culture and history.
So, what does make humans unique? It is imagination. It is the ability of the
humanbrain to entertain aworld view that no longer relies exclusively on experience
but also on images created “inside” the cortex. This implies the freedom to imagine
a future that is disconnected from the past. Humans are imaginative rule-makers.
Let us consider the production of tools as an exemplar. Primates have combina-
torial skills, and, given their inherited instinct to play, some kind of chance events
that lead to the use of tools are likely to occur frequently. Chance events still play
a large role in all human invention, but unlike other primates, humans recognize
the regularities that show up in the process of trial and error and see them as a
complex of rules. Humans are able to plan the chance process and devise their rules
accordingly. Humans make technical rules. Even today, the conscious use of trial
and error in discovery is still very important in some industries, for instance, the
biochemical and pharmaceutical industries.
Humans are capable of socially and technically organizing their conscious ef-
forts to increase their knowledge base for economic operations. Individual imag-
ination occurs in a context of socially shared imagination. This creative circuit
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essentially distinguishes human life from the social life of other primates who re-
spond not to cognitively-anticipated problems but to environmentally-given ones.
Symbolic-abstract language may have played a crucial role in the emergence
of shared imaginary worlds. Human culture was possibly triggered by the change
in a single gene that relates to the larynx and tongue and was necessary for evolv-
ing speech and verbal language. Ku¨ppers has argued that the essential difference
between humans and all other nature lies in the fact that humans can ask questions
and the rest of nature cannot (Ku¨ppers, 1990). This is not just a metaphor, as this
ability accounts for the essential fact that humans can exercise their imagination.
Arguably, the concept of imagination has not exercised that of mainstream
economists. However, from the time of classical economics onwards there have
always been economists who did recognize the signiﬁcance of this human trait
for economic life. More recently, the proponents of post-Keynesian and Austrian
economics have given primacy to the concept of imagination in their work. For
instance, Shackle put the notions of imagination and radical uncertainty at the cen-
ter stage of his post-Keynesian analysis (Shackle, 1981), and Loasby recognizes
the signiﬁcance of creative advance for the process of the growth of economic
knowledge (Loasby, 1999). Witt has employed the concept of imagination in his
theory of the ﬁrm and has introduced the notions of vision and cognitive leader-
ship (Witt, 1998). Metcalfe evokes human imagination in his concept of “restless
capitalism”, which is unique in its ability to explain the task of coordination in the
“restless” context of experimenting and innovating (Metcalfe, 2004). In his ear-
lier work, Hayek developed a neuronal network model of the brain and connected
it to the demand for, and capability of, alertness and imagination that individual
agents are confronted with in their search for information in a decentralized market
(Hayek, 1952). Following Hayek’s lead, various authors have further developed the
neuronal-cognitive network model (Herrmann-Pillath, 1992; Birner, 1999; Feser,
2003).
There is little evidence available for where and how imagination occurs in
the human brain. Neuroeconomic experiments may be more difﬁcult to conduct,
since the phenomenon of imagination is conceivably less amenable to analytical
precision than that of the emotional articulation of fear, anger or aversion. However,
the signiﬁcance of the factor of imagination for economic life can not be discounted
on grounds of experimental or methodological difﬁculty.
14 Rule adoption: efﬁciency
The second and third phases of the trajectory refer to the various forms of rule
adoption. (Note the difference between adoption and adaptation, which is one form
of adoption). It begins with the complex decision to adopt a given rule (Winter,
2004), to learn it, to adapt it to ﬁt into the existing knowledge base of the agent in
phase 2 (Day, 1975; Dosi et al., 2004), and ﬁnally to stabilize the adopted rule in
the knowledge base for recurrent use in phase three (Nelson, 2002). The criterion
applied in rule adoption is basically one of efﬁciency. The measurement rod is
basically quantitative. Given its efﬁcacious application, the adoption of a rule may
be more or less efﬁcient.
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From an evolutionary angle, it will be recognized that efﬁciency may apply
to either the generic or to the operant level of an economic system. The latter is
the domain of neoclassical economics; speciﬁcally, of efﬁciency stated in terms of
optimum decision making under constraints. The performance standard is operant
efﬁciency applied in a decision theoretic context. In contradistinction, cognition
and behavior along the rule trajectory refer to generic traits and consequently the
performance standard is generic efﬁciency. That is, generic cognition and generic
behaviormay bemore or less efﬁcient.A learning ruleAmay be efﬁciency-superior
to learning rule B, or the generic knowledge base of an agent X may enable
that agent to employ rule A more efﬁciently than agent Y . Analogously, generic
efﬁciency is a relevant criterion in phase three when maintaining the knowledge
base of a rule carrier.Agents or ﬁrmswill have a selective advantage in a competitive
market if they can base their operations on superior routine-efﬁciency.
Localization of the cortical areas that account for the ability of efﬁcient cog-
nition and efﬁcient behavior seems to be straightforward on the basis of the brain
model outlined. The tasks in question require analytical and sequential skills typi-
cally performed by the left hemisphere of the cortex. Neuroeconomic experiments
presumably will demonstrate that increased neuronal activity arises when a subject
is asked to solve an analytical, propositional or sequential problem.
However, the experimental outcomes may differ depending on whether the re-
quirement for efﬁciency relates to the performance of an operant or to a generic
task. Calculations when shopping, drawing up a ﬁnancial business plan, using a
pocket calculator, abacus or supercomputer commonly require abilities for solving
analytical and sequential tasks. In turn, rule adoption and learning involve a com-
plex procedure for ﬁtting new knowledge into a given knowledge base. Generic
efﬁciency calls not only for computational skills but also for abilities that rely on
the neuronal activities of the right hemisphere of the cortex. Additionally, it will
also involve a larger measure of motivation which depends on the archecortical
layers responsible for emotions and drives. As with imagination and efﬁcacy, the
measuring of generic efﬁciency in an experiment will prove to be a challenging task
due to the cortical interconnectivities abovementioned. The link between economic
behavior and the activated cortical areas may be fuzzy, but it does exist and may be
further investigated scientiﬁcally.
15 Conclusions
Ever since economics emancipated itself from philosophy in the second half of
the 18th century, it has been occupied with two grand questions: economic coor-
dination and economic change. As we have seen, neoclassical economics makes
the ﬁrst question its focal point and views the dynamic as a path of continuously
restored equilibria. Coordination is interpreted as the allocation of scarce resources
under the assumption of a law (rationality assumption) and a ceteris paribus clause
with respect to the slowly changing historical variables (technology, preferences,
institutions, and other generic variables). Micro foundations for neoclassical eco-
nomics refer to the rationality assumption and to the related domains of operant
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cognition and operant behavior. We have acknowledged recent progress in exper-
imental behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. But we have also challenged
the view that empirical ﬁndings of an experimental program centering around these
questions will automatically produce a new (and possibly non-) neoclassical theory.
The research program of evolutionary economics differs from that of neoclas-
sical economics in two essential ways. First, it starts expressly with dynamics and
views coordination as a temporary stationary state of an evolving economic sys-
tem. Second, the explanation of coordination and change takes place at the generic
level deﬁned as the locus of economic rules. The micro foundations of an evolu-
tionary economic theory must meet the criteria of instrumental adequacy in terms
of understanding the cognition and the behavior of homo sapiens oeconomicus as
a rule maker and a rule user. Economic performance is therefore not conﬁned to
operant efﬁciency, such as allocation efﬁciency; it includes generic efﬁciency and
efﬁcacy as well. The forces at work in an evolving economic system, and the stan-
dards by which their performance is measured, are captured by the triad of factors:
imagination, efﬁcacy and efﬁciency.
The construel of homo sapiens oeconomicus is designed to frame relevant ques-
tions for an evolutionary economic theory and to furnish some empirically accept-
able assumptions for its micro foundations.We close with a note of hope – the hope
that experimental economists and modelers of all kinds will gradually occupy the
terrain and close the remaining conceptual and empirical gaps.
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